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For many readers of this sometimes uncannily prescient and admirably prolific French 
philosopher, the first encounter with Bernard Stiegler came with his (at the current count) three-
volume Technics and Time (Stiegler, 1994). In the first volume, The Fault of Epimetheus, Stiegler 
re-reads the familiar Greek myth in order to restage a philosophy of technics, a philosophy that 
denies the privileged position of the human which almost all theories and theorists of technology, 
whether they recognize it or not, take for granted. For readers of Management Learning who 
might be inspired to take the leap into Stiegler’s body of work, I would suggest beginning with 
either one or two of the shorter texts - For a New Critique of Political Economy (Stiegler, 2010) 
and What Makes Life Worth Living (Stiegler, 2013) are both pithy insights into his central thesis 
– or one of his two most recent texts: Automatic Society vol. 1 (Stiegler, 2016) and The Age of 
Disruption (Stiegler, 2019). This recent work embeds his re-reading of technology into a wide-
ranging enquiry into what he suggests is the general state of disillusion and delinquency affecting 
most of the developed world, and a state largely conditioned by our increasingly networked and 
digitally enabled hyper-industrial economies. As an academic concerned with the impact of 
digital technologies on business and management education, and as a reader of Management 
Learning, I find in Stiegler’s work a continual and urgent provocation to ask what are the kind of 
pedagogic, management and organizational practices that could survive in such a climate, and to 
do so responsibly, usefully, and in such a way which might sustain the communities, societies, 
and political economies upon which they rely. 
In The Age of Disruption, Stiegler suggests a contemporary malaise or disenchantment to 
be the product of a neoliberal, capitalist model of consumption which has increasingly been 
driven by the disruptive power of the technologies of ‘progress’. At the same time, this is read 
alongside some occasional glimmers of how these same technologies, and the lives lived amongst 
them, might be re-enchanted through a more positive ‘noetic’ life, that is, a life in which an 
intergenerational transmission and translation of knowledge provides a profound foundation for 
social and individual well-being. Stiegler’s project, then, is primarily a therapeutics, and one that 
positions technology at the ‘default of origin’, that is, as a quasi-essential supplement through 
which the very notion of the human, and its future, can be reinvented. This position allows us to 
ask important questions regarding the capability of educational institutions to respond to a 
climate in which the industrial scale deployment of networked digital technologies has led to a 
dissolution of the conditions for the formation of attention, the effect of which is an increasingly 
automated society, and one which encourages a short-sighted willingness to forego a long-term 
concern for the future; a position which, for Stiegler, fetishizes a certain barbaric, buccaneer 
madness, and has a contempt for reflective, sustained thought. 
The result of all this, of course, is an intellectual race to the bottom; one happening at an 
alarming speed, and not least because it is conditioned by a consumerist model that has reached 
its limits: ‘because it has become systemically short-termist, because it has given rise to a 
systemic stupidity that structurally prevents the reconstitution of a long-term horizon’ (Stiegler, 
2010; 5). Such systemic stupidity, then, is a result of the battle for the formation of attention 
which, at the last count, the market driven programming industries which seem to increasingly 
determine much of our political and social lives (industries represented by entities such as 
Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft) have all but won. As Daniel Ross explains, the 
consequences of this for the future of education could be catastrophic: 
Given that a large portion of this vast apparatus is systematically directed at children 
and youth – with the goal of interfering with the functioning of inter-generational 
authority and the transmission of intergenerational knowledge, reducing desire to the 
shortest-term satisfactions of consumerist behaviour, producing vicious circles and 
leading to the logic of addiction (where consumption perpetually increases and 
satisfaction perpetually decreases) – the deleterious effect on the possibility of every 
work of learning and teaching becomes obvious and undeniable, however often denied 
(Ross, 2019). 
To demonstrate this argument, Stiegler often refers to the global financial crash of 2008, 
and in a useful footnote in The Age of Disruption, the notion of systemic stupidity is read in 
relation to Alan Greenspan’s explanation for missing the warning signs that led up to this event:  
[…] Greenspan bore witness, in his replies during the Congressional hearing in 
Washington before which he appeared on 23 October 2008, to the fact that he himself 
was proletarianized by the automation of financial decision-making […] Greenspan can 
summon up this alibi, and that doing so does not seem totally wrong or deceitful, only 
because the system is indeed based on a systemic dissimulation, the consequence of 
which is that risks are taken that can no longer be calculated at all other than by 
algorithms that make impossible any decision about the precise level of risk they 
involve […] In this regard, the proletarianization of Greenspan himself is indeed actual’ 
(Stiegler, 2019a; 367). 
Stiegler’s argument suggests that the automation of financial decision-making rendered it 
impossible for Greenspan to make decisions about the outcomes of such processes. But the 
appearance of ‘overly complicated models’ is just that, an apparition, one summoned by an 
algorithmically governed financial industry a symptom of which are heads of international 
finance whose proletarianized thought-processes short-circuit an understanding of that very 
industry. In this respect, Greenspan’s alibi is both genuine and insincere: he did fail to understand 
the complex predictive models, but his response is like that of an automaton whose capacity to 
comprehend the complexities of algorithmic decision making has been designed out. We are, 
then, increasingly at risk of losing the intellectual capacity to understand our current situation, 
and thus incapable of spotting, let alone understanding, the inherent dangers toward which 
industrial scale, data-driven policy and decision making is taking us.  
This example is, of course, not unfamiliar to readers of Management Learning. Several 
articles have also raised the question of how business and management education has at least 
partly contributed to the financial crisis, and several others have suggested possible foundations 
for change in its aftermath. Matt Statler summarizes the arguments of many of these 
commentators when he suggests that ‘over the course of the history of the business school, the 
role of normative, practical knowledge has been eclipsed by value-free, scientific knowledge, 
culminating with the neoclassical notion that all human social interactions may be understood 
objectively in the aggregate as market forces (Statler, 2014). For Statler, one response to this 
might be a renewed focus on the accumulation of practical wisdom. Borrowing from Aristotle’s 
notion of phronesis, and with all the necessary caveats, he posits that perhaps the ‘best thing 
anybody can do is to prepare oneself by training the habits of mind and body that are attuned to 
the world and yet reflexive about the limitations of our own knowledge and actions (Statler, 
2014). Lancione and Clegg also suggest that one response to some of the post-crash challenges 
faced by business and management educators would be a similar focus on the question of how 
to provide students with the opportunities to ask how a critical and creative engagement with 
the world might lead to better judgment. With their emphasis on design, and on the business 
and management schools of the future affording spaces for critical and creative practice, they 
conclude that ‘being reflexive about the spaces we work in and we contribute to reproducing is 
a step forward to a different mode of management learning’ (Lancione & Clegg, 2014).  
Both of these responses highlight the importance of developing habits aimed towards an 
ethical and virtuous life, and ask how we might design such habits into business and management 
pedagogies. This complements Stiegler’s focus on steering our activities towards maintaining the 
desire for the ideals that should suffuse every academic discipline as their incalculable horizon, 
ideals such as truth, beauty and justice. Such ideals are those forever out-of-reach objects of 
desire that condition all noetic activity, the capacity for which the short-circuiting of thought by 
the programming industries is at risk of eradicating. Indeed, for anyone trying to think through 
the implications of the financial crash on business and management pedagogies, his suggestion 
that there can be no economy without desire, and no credit without trust, might mean that a 
return to his reading of the libidinal economy in What Makes Life Worth Living (Stiegler, 2013), 
would be worth the trouble. What this should also highlight, however, is the urgency of asking 
such questions in educational institutions that are increasingly at risk from a certain 
proletarianisation of the mind.  
This dilemma is addressed in the opening to Stiegler’s 2015 text, Automatic Society vol. 1: 
The Future of Work, when he situates it in relation to Chris Anderson’s claim that, in the age of 
big data, the requirement for theory based academic endeavor is limited, if not obsolete 
(Anderson, 2008): 
Continuing with a form of reasoning similar to that which he applies to the 
epidemiology of Google, Anderson comes to the conclusion that what is referred to 
today as ‘big-data’ […] no longer has any need for either theory or theorists – as if data 
‘scientists’, specialists in the application of mathematics to very large databases 
through the use of algorithms, could replace those theoreticians that scientists always 
are in principle. (Stiegler, 2016: 1)  
At stake here is the relationship between automation and intelligence, and of the reduction 
of thought to its manipulation by algorithmically driven digital networks. This leads to the most 
recent stage of a more general shift to proletarianization, whereby the process identified by Marx 
as the subsuming of manual skills into their mechanical reproduction, which then morphed into 
the mediatized capture of everyday life by the ‘culture industries’ - as identified by Horkheimer 
and Adorno (2002) – has shifted further still into its current stage, in which the very capacity to 
think is reduced to calculable elements which can be organized and manipulated by phenomena 
such as social media. For Stiegler, this leads to the ‘systemic stupidity’ already noted, whereby 
the failure to comprehend our lack of comprehension produces a world in which theory can be 
bypassed by data driven automated decision-making: 
With the advent of reticular reading and writing (Herrenschmidt 2007) via networks 
made accessible to everyone through the implementation, beginning in 1993, of the 
technologies of the World Wide Web, digital technologies have led hyperindustrial 
societies toward a new stage of proletarianization—through which the hyperindustrial 
age becomes the era of systemic stupidity […]. Such is also the case for digital networks. 
But through the latter, stupefaction and stupidity are being installed in a new and 
functional way: in such a way that disruption can structurally and systemically short-
circuit and bypass the knowledge of psychic and collective individuals. This is what will 
here be called “systemic stupidity.” (Stiegler, 2019b) 
What is central here is Stiegler’s reading of a new stage of technological development as 
the condition of a ‘disruption’ which short circuits the very institutions and organizations which 
may enable a thoughtful, careful consideration of that evolution. In other words, the disruption 
caused by industrial scale digital technology is pervasive to such an extent that it rapidly renders 
obsolete those institutions – such as universities – which might be able to think through the 
implications of that disruption. This is an alarming double-bind which Stiegler continually 
reaffirms, and which, when reading him, I continually come back to. Should it be true, it would 
mean that we could quite possibly be past the point at which this dissolution of the capacity to 
think can be reversed. At this point, one is also minded to consider the parallel trends of an 
inability to comprehend the impending climate catastrophe, a crisis in the ability to practice wise 
judgment and to lead amidst situations of increased complexity, as well as the apparent 
eradication of our so-called democratic institutions and their shrinking ability to deal with the 
implications of radical technological change; in all these cases the reaction is to retreat and to 
entrench populist agendas which speak to an increasingly resentful and anxious majority.  
At this point it would perhaps be wise to ask to what point are we are all symptoms of the 
same ‘systemic dissimulation’, a dissimulation that promotes an inherently irresponsible risk-
taking, or dissociative apathy, as the only natural reactions to a world increasingly driven by an 
impenetrable algorithmic modelling. Is our capacity to judge our ability to make decisions in such 
a world compromised in advance? Again, this would highlight the importance of making space 
for critical and creative reflection in our educational institutions, but it also chimes with the 
central question of The Age of Disruption, which asks how we have let this systemic tendency 
towards irresponsibility and stupidity masquerade under the guise of innovation and disruption, 
particularly when the prevalence of the latter seems to come at the cost of a certain care for the 
irreducible bond between the individual and the social: 
Disruption essentially consists in outstripping and overtaking social organizations, and, 
through that, in short-circuiting collective individuation and transindividuation. 
Disruption, then, is based on the destruction of every psychosocial structure that 
enables the construction of such an economy – an economy that is simultaneously and 
indissolubly psychic and social, which means that changing the social also changes the 
psychic. (Stiegler, 2019a; 81). 
A focus on the destruction of psychosocial structures allows Stiegler, following the work of Peter 
Sloterdijk (Sloterdijk, 2014), to develop the fascinating link between delinquency and what many 
might refer to as progress. Indeed, in a remarkable section from The Age of Disruption, he links 
the hubris of neoliberal globalization with an increasing tendency towards disinhibition, a 
tendency which links Silicon Valley to the White House, as well as to the attacks on London Bridge 
and the anger of the Parisian banlieue; each example channeling a certain nihilist disenchantment 
as the legitimation for drive-based violence, a violence arising ‘without a therapeutic’. This marks 
a point at which the systemic stupidity as demonstrated in 2008 has morphed into the 
generalized madness of our present moment, itself an especially dangerous stage in that such 
disinhibited barbarism is quickly becoming normalized through our politics, economic policy and 
industrial strategies.    
This shift to a focus on madness makes it possible for Stiegler to hold together the notions 
of neoliberal disruption with terrorism and the artist-genius; a crucial series of themes in that 
Stiegler seems to posit a very fine line between what might ruin us, and what might save us. But 
in doing this Stiegler also runs the risk of suffering from the same dilemma which, from Descartes 
onwards, impacts anyone who tries to summon the term ‘madness’ in order to delimit it, define 
it, and make it work for them. Indeed, because the precise meaning and location of madness is 
impossible to define once and for all, anyone who tries to stake a claim to this term is reducing 
to calculable rationalism the very thing which they are trying to describe as somehow beyond the 
rational. Stiegler may be wise to this of course, not least when he states that the ‘possibility of 
madness is the condition of reason, and so to speak, its reason’. But on the same page he also 
states that madness is that which ‘possesses the barbarians’ as their hubris, and as that which is 
‘manifested in the kind of ‘end of an era’ behavior that accompanies all great collapse’ (Stiegler, 
2019a; 40). Nevertheless, Stiegler is onto something in his relating of a certain productive 
madness to a disruptive hubris, not least in the way that the hubristic madness as demonstrated 
by the disruptive ‘barbarians’ of French entrepreneurism, seems only one remove from the 
‘delirious’ dreaming Stiegler himself encounters as he cycles through the Bourbonnais dictating 
his work into a machine, or the ‘possibility of madness’ which Stiegler turns into a ‘source and 
resource’ of positive, noetic enterprise during his incarceration in 1983 (the story of which is also 
fascinating, in the sense of it being a bildungsroman or pedagogic autobiography which 
intermittently surfaces through into the more condensed philosophical work) (see, for example: 
Stiegler, 2019a; 310). Madness, then, for Stiegler as for many others, appears to be a double-
edged; much like Plato’s pharmakon, and the philosophy of technics it provokes, Stiegler’s oeuvre 
touches on what is at once both the poison and the cure.1 
In closing it is also worth noting Stiegler’s repeated focus on the notion of the transitional 
object. This refers to a theory of childhood development as conditioned by early object relations, 
and was first proposed by the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott. The transitional object returns 
again and again in Stiegler’s work as a demonstration of the relationship between technology 
and education. This, for me, approaches the more positive aspect of Stiegler’s project, and begins 
to outline a possible, and pragmatic, method of reenchanting our current malaise. It is also 
something which the programming institutions, those educational institutions that Stiegler 
opposes to the programming industries, can practically implement through pedagogies which 
counter the reductive, calculative and somewhat automatic programming of our children by 
reticulated digital technologies as exemplified by social media networks. What is missing from 
almost all Stiegler’s work, however, and indeed in many similar readings of the digital milieu of 
our current age, is the necessary work on the question of sexual difference. The key perpetrators 
of hubristic madness, both positive and negative, are men, and the statistics and events he cites 
as evidence of a decline in morality, for example, and those which evidence an increase in 
disinhibition and a resurfacing of the death drive as the lack of a reason to live, are almost 
uniquely focussed on men. What is the significance of this omission for a history and theory of 
technology? And what might it say about the production and future of thought and knowledge 
in increasingly disruptive, hyper-industrial digital economies? To even begin to address such 
questions would, of course, require us to go much further afield. For the moment, however, it is 
perhaps enough to suggest that, in reading Stiegler’s work, it is possible to identify such gaps 
                                                          
1 For more on this it would be necessary to revisit Derrida’s reading of the term in: Derrida, 1981, pp.62-171. 
against a backdrop of what is, at times, a quite brilliant articulation of some of the most pressing 
questions of our era. 
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